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A HISTORICAL REFLECTION ON ARBITRATION AND THE
CORPORATION AS AN OBJECT OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Eric George*
In recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has
reaffirmed its emphatic interpretation of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). In both AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, the Court ruled that the purpose of the FAA was
not merely to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration by placing
agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts,
but to actively promote the use of arbitration on a national
scale. In the pursuit of this agenda, the Court has shown that it
is prepared to oppose measures that would make arbitration
more sluggish and expensive, even if this means enforcing
arbitral awards that might conflict with state law or public
policy.
This Article argues that the Court’s routinely invoked language
of “costs,” “expediency,” and the need to protect the “freedom
of contract” has the effect of concealing a transformation that is
of broader political-economic importance—the creation of
conditions that protect corporations from public interference.
When corporations have the assurance that their arbitration
agreements will, in all likelihood, be enforced, and furthermore,
that their disputing activities will not be subject to public
oversight, they gain a greater latitude to act without
encountering public interference. In other words, they gain
more power. In order to illustrate the dimensions of this shift, I
identify parallels between the present-day arbitration regime
and the arbitration movement that culminated in the creation of
the FAA in the 1920s.

INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that the arbitration regime being fostered
* Eric George is a PhD candidate in the department of Political Science at York
University in Toronto.
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by the United States Supreme Court has disproportionately served
the interests of corporate disputants. When the Supreme Court
opposes measures that will jeopardize the “freedom of contract”
and makes arbitration more expensive and sluggish, it is aligning
itself with a laissez-faire vision of arbitration that was promoted by
early twentieth century legal reformers, and culminated in the
creation of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. According to
proponents of this view, parties to arbitration agreements are
autonomous, individual, self-regulating agents who should have the
latitude and discretion to order their disputes free from the
oversight of the state. From this vantage point, any law or policy
that might interfere with the freedom of contract—itself embodied
in the arbitration agreement—would constitute a threat to the
integrity of the arbitration system itself. The resuscitation of this
1920s vision is significant insofar as it serves to shield corporations
from public scrutiny.
The ideological affinity between the present-day arbitration
regime and that which emerged in the 1920s can be identified along
two central axes. First, the Court’s belief that state interference in
the arbitral process compromises the “freedom of contract” has its
roots in a laissez-faire inspired conception of business “selfregulation”—itself buttressed by a commitment to keeping private
actors free from the intrusion of regulators and policymakers.
Second, like the arbitration movement of the 1920s, the
contemporary arbitration regime has been the target of an
extensive corporate lobbying effort that seeks to ensure that the
system is aligned with the interests of the business community.
Such lobbying efforts often pledge to “honor parties’ agreements”
or to keep arbitration cheap, fast, and flexible. In reality, they are
ultimately opposed to greater public interference in the arbitration
system, irrespective of whether such interference comes from
judges, regulators, watchdog groups, journalists, or citizens. Public
encroachment presents a threat to the values of speed, opacity, and
finality upon which arbitration is modeled.1
1. As Thomas Schultz points out, arbitrators are:
[P]eople . . . whose income, social status, intellectual recognition, or
professional power, depends to a large extent, on the continued existence
of arbitration as we have known it for the last few decades. For such
people, arbitration must not change. They would fight tooth and nail to
keep the arbitration system as it is, or similar to it, to protect it from
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This Article proceeds in three main sections. The first section
provides an overview of critical responses to the Supreme Court’s
rulings in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, I argue that the critiques
of asymmetric bargaining power of the arbitration regime have
overlooked a less visible, but nonetheless important form of
power—the protection of corporations from public interference.
The second section traces this form of business power back to the
laissez-faire conception of arbitration that informed the early
twentieth century arbitration movement. The third section shows
how the FAA was the target of an extensive corporate lobbying
effort that sought to promote the principles of business “selfgovernance” and private-ordering. The Article concludes with a
reflection on the parallels between the 1920s arbitration reform
movement and present-day efforts to limit public involvement in
the arbitration system, and the way that such measures serve the
interests of capital.
I.

THE CONTEMPORARY BACKLASH AGAINST ARBITRATION

Arbitration is conventionally treated as a private, contractual,
and non-adjudicative mechanism of dispute resolution that leads to
a more efficient distribution of judicial resources. As a cheaper,
faster, and more flexible surrogate to civil litigation, it is not only
thought to be of benefit to the parties immediately involved in the
dispute (the claimant and the respondent), but to produce a
number of positive second-order effects for society as a whole.2
possibly destabilizing interferences.
THOMAS SCHULTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LEGALITY: STATELESS LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (2014).
2. The view that arbitration is efficiency promoting finds exponents in the areas
of both domestic and international arbitration. As Walter Mattli and Thomas Dietz
argue, for example, “The economic rationalist model further implies that
organizational efficiency of arbitration forums is good not only for the contracting
parties (by generating private gains), it also is good for the wider public.” Walter
Mattli & Thomas Dietz, Mapping and Assessing the Rise of International Commercial
Arbitration in the Globalization Era: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CONTENDING THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE 9 (2014). For a similar view, albeit, in the area of domestic arbitration, see
Stephen Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good?: ‘Overcrowded Courts’ and the PrivateSector Alternative of Arbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899, 921 (2013).
For an overview of the merits of privatizing dispute resolution services, see LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN & ERIN A. O’HARA, THE LAW MARKET (2009).
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Such effects include the decongestion of overcrowded court
dockets, the creation of a more responsive market for adjudication
services, and the placement of downward pressure on consumer
prices by reducing legal costs.3 In addition to these material
benefits, arbitration-friendly policies are thought to promote the
value of private autonomy—the idea that individuals are best able
to determine how they wish their disputes to be adjudicated.4
Under this general argumentative framework, the United States
Supreme Court has spearheaded a distinctly pro-arbitration policy
over the last forty years.5
However, amidst the acclaimed “arbitration revolution,” most
visibly incarnate in the Supreme Court’s emphatic approach to
arbitration and the massive expansion of the arbitration services
sector, there have been a number of dissenting voices.6 One of the
first and best-known critiques came almost as soon as the
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) movement had begun. In
his now well-known piece “Against Settlement,” Owen Fiss
presented a series of criticisms against the increasingly emboldened

3. Gillian Hadfield identifies the state’s “inherent monopoly” over the provision
of adjudication services as the primary contributor to the inefficiency of litigation. In
her view, the state is “unresponsive to costs, reluctant to innovate, bureaucratic in its
methods of collecting and processing information, shut off from entrepreneurial
creativity and effort.” Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, 24 REG. 40, 40
(2001). See also Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001) (suggesting that
such businesses may pass on savings to consumers.).
4. As Thomas Carbonneau explains, “Parties in the marketplace should be at
liberty to agree to any exchange to which they mutually consent and which complies
with the minimal requisites of public policy.” Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in
Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 400
(2008). Hiro Aragaki places emphasis on the wide berth given to disputants to
determine the terms by which the dispute will be arbitrated: “Unlike the one-size-fitsall approach of litigation, arbitration’s hallmark has been the wide scope of choice that
it provides for parties to design a disputing procedure best suited to their needs and
circumstances.” Hiro N. Aragaki, Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements
Promote Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 1143, 1145 (2015).
5. For an overview of the Supreme Court’s support for arbitration, see Stephen
L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996).
6. Thomas Carbonneau characterizes the increased use of arbitration over the
last forty years as a “revolution in law.” Thomas E. Carbonneau, Revolution in Law
through Arbitration, The Eighty-Fourth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar
Lecture, 56 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 233 (2008).
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proponents of arbitration.7 While the advocates of ADR had
pledged their efforts to discovering faster and cheaper forms of
litigation as a means of achieving procedural reform, Fiss argued
that such endeavors overlooked the problem of power. At the
heart of the reform movement was the assumption that disputes
involved consenting individuals. Yet, in conceiving of parties as
“individuals” or “neighbors,” Fiss argued that the proponents of
ADR had turned a blind eye to the problem of organizational
power and wealth of large-scale organizations like corporations,
government agencies, or unions—all of whom had greater chances
of winning legal disputes against weaker parties.8 In Fiss’ view, the
administrators of private tribunals had fewer resources at their
disposal than courts did to address imbalances of power between
disputants, and were far less likely to yield just outcomes than
public courts.9
We know in retrospect that the early critiques of ADR made
by Fiss and others did little to slow down the extraordinary
expansion of the arbitration system that developed over the
subsequent decades.10 As the popularity of arbitration surged
throughout the 1990s, even some of the more poignant criticisms of
arbitration resounded faintly amidst what one commentator
referred to as “the triumph of arbitration.”11 Moreover, it became
increasingly clear that the earlier progressive hopes for a more
“human” and “dialogic” form of adjudication had been overtaken
by a push for “alternatives to the high cost of litigation” from the
corporate sector.12 By 1991, Carrie Menkel-Meadow spoke of
7. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1983).
8. Fiss thought that the greatest potential for abuse arose from asymmetric
bargaining scenarios. “In these cases, the distribution of financial resources, or the
ability of one party to pass along its costs, will invariably infect the bargaining process,
and the settlement will be at odds with a conception of justice that seeks to make the
wealth of the parties irrelevant.” Id.
9. Id.
10. For early critiques of ADR, see, e.g., CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW
JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO
COURT (1985); RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST
SOCIETY: THE EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE (1987); Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986).
11. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration,
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 423 (2008).
12. The International Institute for Conflict Prevention (CPR) is an arbitration
advocacy group that seeks to promote solutions to the high costs of litigation faced by
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ADR “as a tale of social innovation co-opted.” A decade later,
Bryant Garth described the private market for dispute resolution
services as increasingly hierarchical and divided with one segment
providing wealthy disputants “a-la-carte” arbitration services and
the other “low-end justice for the rank and file.”13
It is only recently, however, that the critique of arbitration has
come back into the public arena, and this time, much more
forcefully than before. In response to the Supreme Court’s rulings
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion14 and American Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Restaurant,15 an increasing number of scholars
have argued that the Court’s pro-arbitration policy has enabled
businesses to thwart lawsuits brought against them by consumers
and employees.16 Critics have claimed that the Court’s willingness
to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses, class-action waivers, and
other fine-print arbitration agreements has served to deny
consumers and employees access to the courts, while at the same
time relieving business disputants of unwanted litigation—evidence
of pro-business bias.17 These issues appear to have gained
increasing public attention following a three-part 2015 New York
Times investigation into the use of arbitration agreements in fine
print contracts, and, more recently, in a New York Review of
Books article by Justice Jed Rakoff of the Southern District Court

corporations. It counts a number of Fortune 500 listed firms amongst its corporate
pledge signers. See 21st Century Pledge, CPR (July 21, 2014), https://www.cpradr.org/
resource-center/adr-pledges/21st-century-pledge [https://perma.cc/JM6P-ZKGS].
13. Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic
Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927,
928, 932 (2001).
14. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
15. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
16. See for example, Hiro Aragaki, who argues the Supreme Court’s “proarbitration” policy has effectively negated state courts’ ability to review or overturn
arbitral awards. Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1233, 1233 (2011). See also David Schwartz, who views mandatory arbitration
agreements as a violation of the principle of consent. David S. Schwartz, ClaimSuppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 Ind. L.J. 239, 244 (2012). Judith Resnik
associates the privatization of adjudication, of which arbitration is an instance, with the
evisceration of rights generally. Judith Resnik Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L.J.
2804 (2014).
17. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
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of New York.18
What the new wave of criticism shares in common with the old
is a heightened awareness of the potential abuses of corporate
power in arbitration. It focuses on the way in which corporations
have been able to use their superior wealth, organizational
resources, and knowledge to gain strategic advantages over
consumers and employees. Yet this focus on inequalities between
disputants has the side effect of drawing attention away from a
more general form of political-economic power engendered by the
arbitration regime. That is, the way the Court’s policy of deferring
to arbitral awards shields commercial disputants from public
interference.
This policy is waged in the name of “cost,”
“expediency,” and “the freedom of contract,” but it has a more
important effect that has not been paid sufficient attention: it alters
the corporation as an object of governance. When corporations are
assured that their disputes will not be publicized, and only in the
narrowest of circumstances be subject to review, they gain greater
latitude to act without encountering resistance from judges,
lawmakers, or civil society—in other words, they gain more power.
We can learn much about how the present-day arbitration
regime shields corporate actors from public interference in
revisiting the arbitration movement that emerged in the 1920s. Not
only did the period witness a surge of interest in arbitration, but it
also offers the closest historical analogue to our current period of
capitalism marked by the privatization of public services, corporate
influence over the legislative process, belief in the self-executing
power of markets, and organized anti-redistributionary sentiment.
In the following section, I shall highlight the way that the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions can be seen as a revival of 1920s ideals of
18. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N. Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-thedeck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4ZHD-LWTW]. As Justice Rakoff writes,
[C]ompanies have widely imposed mandatory arbitration clauses on their
employees and customers, so as to deny them access to the courts, as well
as to exclude them from exercising their constitutional right to a jury. In
addition, since the Concepcion decision, most such clauses also forbid
people with complaints to bring class action claims, even in arbitration.
Jed. S., Rakoff, Why You Won’t Get Your Day in Court, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (Nov. 24,
2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/24/why-you-wont-get-your-day-incourt/ [https://perma.cc/7KRG-KXQD].
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free enterprise and business “self-regulation.”

II.

ARBITRATION AND THE IDEAL OF BUSINESS SELFREGULATION

In this section, I claim that the Supreme Court’s policy of
deferring to arbitral authority by “honoring parties expectations”
resuscitates a laissez-faire-inspired ideal of arbitration that found
its most cogent expression in the early twentieth century arbitration
reform movement.19 Taken at face value, the Court’s pledge to
keep arbitration cheap, fast, and flexible, and its defense of the
“freedom of contract,” appear innocuous and devoid of ideological
content. However, when we understand the broader historical
context in which this discourse is embedded, the political-economic
parameters of the Court’s pro-arbitration policy come into sharper
relief.
Although periods of experimentation with arbitration in
America can be traced as far back as the colonial period, the
current fascination with arbitration and private alternatives to
court finds its most compelling precedent in the early twentieth
century arbitration reform movement.20 The proponents of the
1920s arbitration reform movement were primarily interested in
developing alternatives to what they perceived to be the excessive
costs, delays, and rupture of business friendships that were
associated with litigation in courts of law.21
Faced with
anachronistic “judicial machinery” that had not kept pace with
rapid advances in business organization, they vowed to devise
19. The Court’s deferential approach to arbitration is described by Stephen Ware
as “rest[ing] on the premise that arbitration law is a part of contract law so courts must
enforce agreements to arbitrate unless contract law provides a ground for denying
enforcement.” Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law
(with a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195,
195 (1997).
20. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860 145–54 (1977).
21. Although figures in the movement were interested in developing private
alternatives to the court for “the layman,” and did discuss the potential uses of
arbitration in family court settings, the main focus was on devising cost-effective
alternatives to business litigation. Amy J. Cohen, Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011
J. DISP. RESOL. 91 (2011).
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inexpensive, speedy, and flexible forums of dispute resolution that
were better suited to the realities of modern commerce.22 Thus,
Charles Bernheimer could proclaim in 1926 that “[t]o litigate, the
most wasteful procedure to which a business man can resort, means
strife expense, annoyance and the rupture of business friendship,
sapping the very lifeblood of commerce.”23 By making the
agreements to arbitrate “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable,” the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sought to overturn longstanding
judicial antipathy to enforcing arbitration agreements, thereby
facilitating commercial parties’ access to private tribunals.24
While the proponents of arbitration reform focused mainly on
rectifying problems of cost and delay, they were also committed to
a broader regulatory framework that promoted private ordering
against direct state interference in business affairs. In the words of
Frances Kellor, Vice-President of the Arbitration Society of
America, the choice to arbitrate was understood to be an
expression
of
“the
natural
right
of
self-regulation,”
“independence,” and “self-reliance” against state encroachment.25
The idea that arbitration should remain free from state interference
fit within a broader political-economic vision of laissez-faire, in
which private ordering was preferred to the direct involvement of
the Federal regulatory agencies.26
22. William L. Ransom, The Layman’s Demand for Improved Judicial
Machinery, 73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 146 (1917) (“The difficulty is
coming as to the mechanics of our judicial system, the suitability of present-day legal
procedure as a modern device for the accomplishment of a basic end, the
administration of prompt, impartial justice under law.”).
23. Charles L. Bernheimer, The Advantages of Arbitration Procedure, 124
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 98 (1926).
24. Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York
Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 147, 160 (1921). As early as 1917, William Ransom could write
that courts’ excessive technicality
naturally arouse the contempt of a business man . . . [driven] from the court house
with the impression that he and other business men are sure to lose, no matter who
wins the juridical verdict, if they have anything to do with “a game played under
such rules”; they represent a kind of “trappings” and “red tape” which business
men have long since rejected, in the conduct of other aspects of human
relationship.
Ransom, supra note 22, at 149.
25. FRANCES A. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY,
FUNCTIONS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS 121 (1999).
26. As Katherine Van Wezel Stone explains, “New capitalists rejected
progressive models of government intervention in the economy, advocating instead a

566

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:557

It would not be until the onset of the Depression that the
arbitration system would draw criticism for being a bastion of
free-enterprise against the regulatory power of the state. In 1934,
Thurman Arnold observed that “arbitration machinery has become
a device to maintain the aloof position of courts and to isolate them
from the technique of investigation and conference.”27 In the same
year, Phillip G. Phillips, observing the way arbitration delimited the
judiciary’s ability to address economic problems of national
importance, posed the question:
But what function have our courts in a nation dedicated to
recovery by improvement of business conditions if it is not to
adjudicate commercial controversies and thereby lay down
rules of law which will assist in the recovery process? To strip
them of this power would be collective laissez-faire of a most
unusual type, a species of fanatical action one would expect in
business anarchy and not in an industrial democracy based on a
partnership between government and business.28

In the order of “business anarchy” described by Phillips,
corporations used arbitration as a means of avoiding public scrutiny
and circumventing the regulatory oversight of the state.
III.

THE FAA’S CORPORATE LOBBY

The claim that business has supported the formation of the
FAA is, on its own, uncontroversial.29 Historians have documented
the activities of a number of business and trade associations that
lobbied in favor of the Act through the New York Chamber of
Commerce, the American Bar Association, and the Arbitration
vision of self-regulation of business through trade associations.” Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77
N.C. L. REV. 931, 990 (1998).
27. Thurman W. Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REV.
913, 929 (1934).
28. Philip G. Phillips, Commercial Arbitration Under the NRA, 1 U. CHI. L.
REV. 424, 439–40 (1934).
29. Indeed, the main spokespersons for the Act were representatives of private
associations, not by elected officials, and the greater share of congressional testimony
appears to have come from private interests. As Imre S. Szalai writes, “During the
1924 Hearings regarding the proposed legislation, virtually all of the written and oral
testimony came from witnesses appearing on behalf of or at the request of commercial
interests.” Imre S. Szalai, Modern Arbitration Values and the First World War, 49 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 380–81 (2007).
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Society of America.30 In characterizing such lobbying efforts as led
by “merchants” and “traders,” historians have generally
overlooked the degree to which lobbying efforts were supported by
the ascendant force in the nation’s economy: large-scale, vertically
integrated, limited liability corporations.31 Indeed, the period
between 1910 and 1930 was characterized by extraordinary
advancements in corporate organization, and saw the consolidation
of a number of business giants, including: General Motors, Ford,
General Electric, the Radio Corporation of America,
Westinghouse, and the Sears Roebuck Corporation—many of
which were part of lobbying efforts in support of commercial
arbitration.32 This oversight is important for two reasons. First, it
understates the role of elite actors in mobilizing for legal reform,
making it seem like the FAA’s social basis of support was much
wider and grassroots-led than it actually was.33 Second, in
overlooking corporate incentives to arbitrate, existing accounts of
the FAA miss the importance of regulatory-avoidance strategies
that were enabled by the emergent arbitration regime.
Business support for the FAA is commonly attributed to two
driving forces. The first is the New York Chamber of Commerce’s
Committee on Arbitration, which, led by Charles Bernheimer and
Julius Cohen, spearheaded a massive lobbying campaign seeking to
promote the use of arbitration amongst both business and the
broader public.34 The second is what Katherine Van Wezel Stone

30. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); Van Wezel
Stone, supra note 26, at 931.
31. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR, THE VISIBLE HAND (1993).
According to Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, the modern business corporation was
unparalleled in terms of its economic power and ability to direct human affairs.
ADOLF AUGUSTUS BERLE & GARDINER COIT MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991).
32. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N., DECENNIAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON THE PROGRESS OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
1926–1936 (1936), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104315850;view=
1up;seq=3 [https://perma.cc/UX7C-RDWD].
33. See, e.g., Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155, 163 (1970) (describing the Arbitration Society of America as
“representative of many groups of people from all walks of life, participating in a new
concept of arbitration.”).
34. As Ian Macneil points out, during “Arbitration Week” in 1923, Charles L.
Bernheimer “arranged a program in which more than fifty trade and commercial
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identifies as the association movement, referring to the increasing
national prominence of trade associations that arose under the
corporatist economic policy harbored by Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover, who would later serve on the board of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA).35 Since many trade
associations already had well-developed, privately administered
systems of arbitration in place to resolve disputes amongst their
members, they were naturally in favor of efforts to bolster the
legitimacy and national profile of arbitration.
Mirroring the discourse of early twentieth-century arbitration
reformers, scholars have spoken of “merchants,” “commercial
interests,” “traders,” and the broader “business community” to
describe the business interests that promoted arbitration during the
1920s. While there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the
FAA did attract the interest of numerous small businesses and
merchants, this language tends to overlook cleavages of market
power that existed amongst the FAA’s business following.
Scholars have overlooked the way in which support for both
Bernheimer’s Committee on Arbitration and Moses Grossman’s
Arbitration Society of America hailed from elements of the
ascendant U.S. corporate sector. To gain a sense of the magnitude
and scope of corporate backing for the FAA, it is instructive to
observe the general membership of the New York Chamber of
Commerce. Between 1910 and 1930, the period roughly coinciding
with the height of the arbitration movement, the commodities
traders that had dominated the Chamber’s membership in the midnineteenth century were increasingly eclipsed by directors of largescale corporations. The Chamber’s 1922 annual report, for
example, features chief executives from virtually every major sector
of American business, including banking, insurance, rail, radio and
telecommunications, oil and gas, retail, automotive, and textiles.36
These include the leaders of some of largest industrialists in the
United States, including Gerard Swope, President of General
organizations participated.” MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 38.
35. “The growth of commercial arbitration went hand in hand with the explosive
growth of trade associations in the 1920s.” Van Wezel Stone, supra note 26, at 977–78.
36. See generally N.Y. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SIXTY FOURTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE CORPORATION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK FOR THE YEAR 1921–1922 34–70 (1922), https://babel.hathitrust.org/
cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015067348808;view=1up;seq=5 [https://perma.cc/6MG7-C5YB].
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Electric; Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Radio Corporation of
America; Jules Bache, investment banker and majority shareholder
of Dome Mines; and Charles M. Schwab, President of U.S. Steel.37
On its own, the incidence of these corporate magnates
amongst the Chamber’s membership is nothing more than
suggestive. It does not offer sufficient evidence to suggest that the
FAA was necessarily any more “pro-corporate” than it favored
“small business.” For example, it is quite possible that elements of
the Chamber’s activity took a passive stance on the arbitration, and
left organizing activities to the Chamber’s Committee on
Arbitration. Yet there is evidence that corporate sponsorship of
the Act was more than just salutary or incidental, but in fact heavily
enmeshed in the planning process.
Frances Kellor, who acted as Vice-President of the American
Arbitration Society (which changed its name to the American
Arbitration Association in 1926), wrote a largely promotional, but
nevertheless informative history of the arbitration movement in
1948 entitled American Arbitration, its History, Functions and
Achievements.38
In the section “Builders of American
Arbitration” she lists some of key business patrons of the
Arbitration Society. These included: Julius Rosenwald, President
of Sears Roebuck corporation; Felix S. Warburg, of the renowned
European banking dynasty; and John D. Rockefeller of Standard
Oil. Anson Burchard, Vice-President of General Electric, would
later serve as the first president of the AAA, the result of the
merger between Bernheimer’s Arbitration Foundation and Moses
Grossman’s Arbitration Society of America.39
By 1936, six years after the FAA was ratified by Calvin
Coolidge, the AAA’s board of directors included an even broader
base of big-business support. They included the National City
Bank of New York, the Metropolitan Trust Company, Goodyear

See generally id.; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 32.
See generally KELLOR, supra note 25.
See generally JOHN N. INGHAM, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS (Greenwood Publ’g Grp., 1983). The American
Arbitration Association was formed through a merger of Moses Grossman’s
Arbitration Society of America and Charles Bernheimer’s Arbitration Foundation.
IAN
R.
MACNEIL,
AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
LAW:
REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 40 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992)
MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 40.
37.
38.
39.
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Tire & Rubber Company, Metropolitan Insurance Company, and
Western Electric.40
The convergence of corporate giants in the arbitration
movement—and the subsequent influence they exerted on its
central institutions—should cast doubt on the still widely held view
that the arbitration movement was, in the first instance, inspired by
the values of progressivism. While the movement did enlist the
contributions of social reformers like Roscoe Pound and saw
business representatives speak of the importance of improving
judicial machinery for “the layman,” such commitments seem to
pale in comparison to the business forces that mobilized behind the
FAA.41 Instead of juxtaposing two mutually exclusive visions of
arbitration—one dedicated to laissez-faire, another to progressive
reform—the more interesting question is how the business has been
able to successfully frame its campaign of judicial privatization in
such a way that has the appearance of benefiting the common
good.
CONCLUSION
I have shown how the arbitration reform movement of the
1920s drew on an extensive basis of corporate support and
demonstrated the way that it centered on laissez-faire-inspired
notions of free-enterprise, individual autonomy, and reliance. It
would be a mistake to understand such efforts as merely being
occupied with the issues of “cost and delay.” Rather, I argue that
proponents of arbitration reform were seeking to reorganize state
power in such a way that bolstered businesses’ ability to act without
encountering public interference. The significance of this project
did not necessarily lie in allowing businesses to abuse their superior
bargaining power over weaker disputants, but in realigning the
regulatory power of the state in such a way that promoted private
ordering. The critics of the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant have raised the spectre of corporate power in
contractual arbitration. Where those critics could go much further,
40. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 32.
41. It provides a forum admirably adapted for the settlement of the troubles of
the small man or the poor man who cannot stand the stress and expense of protracted
litigation. Bernheimer, supra note 23, at 99–100.
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however, is in studying the less conspicuous modes through which
business disputants have used arbitration to their own advantage.
Those who hold hopes for more progressive or democratic uses of
arbitration should take stock of the ongoing campaign of judicial
privatization being waged by courts, corporations, and
governments, and shed greater light on the strategies of regulatory
avoidance in which they enable corporations to engage.

